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Examining the American Bar Association’s
Ratings of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000
James T. Lindgren

Abstract

In this study, Professor Lindgren examined data on the 108 confirmed nominees to
the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal from the administrations of George H.W. Bush
and William J. Clinton. He shows - for the first time - evidence of differential treatment of nominees by the American Bar Association’s rating committee. Yet this
is not a simple story of apparent ABA bias toward Clinton nominees. Among confirmed nominees with the most important credential - prior judicial experience Bush nominees fare roughly as well and sometimes even better than Clinton nominees. The problem arises for those without judicial experience. Here the apparent
preference for Clinton appointees is strikingly large. Without controlling for any
credentials, Clinton confirmed nominees have 9.1 times as high odds of getting
a unanimous well qualified rating as do Bush confirmed nominees. Controlling
for credentials, Clinton nominees have 9.7-15.9 times as high odds of getting a
unanimous well qualified ABA rating as similarly credentialed Bush appointees.
For those without prior judicial experience, just being nominated by Clinton instead of Bush is a stronger positive variable than any other credential or than all
other credentials put together. The differences in how the ABA treats Bush and
Clinton nominees reaches even to the committee’s internal decision making. The
ABA committee split its vote 33% of the time while evaluating Bush appointees,
but only 17% of the time when evaluating Clinton appointees. This difference
was concentrated among those who lacked prior judicial experience, where 50%
of Bush appointees had split ratings, compared to only 10% of Clinton appointees
with split ratings.

Forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Politics (October 2001)

Examining the American Bar Association's
Ratings of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000
James Lindgren 1

I
Introduction
The American Bar Association has been rating federal judges since
the late 1940s.2 It was first brought into the process for political reasons—to
reduce the ability of Harry Truman to appoint minorities, women, and
“leftists.”3 Whether in its judicial ratings the ABA might still be performing
1

. Professor of Law; Director of the Demography of Diversity Project; Director of
Faculty Research; Northwestern University. J.D., 1977, University of Chicago; B.A.,
1974, Yale University; currently Ph.D. Student, Sociology, University of Chicago.
Chair-Elect, AALS Section on Social Science. I very much appreciate the helpful
comments of two friends who were involved in judicial selection—William Marshall in
the Clinton transition and administration and Stephen Calabresi in the Reagan/Bush
administrations.
The data for this project were collected by Leonard Leo, Peter Redpath, and
Gerarda Walsh of the Federalist Society for the newsletter ABA Watch. I checked four of
the six credentials variables against the standard academic database and resolved
differences by going to original sources. The ABA Watch’s collection and coding was
substantially more accurate than the standard database. I am grateful for the willingness
of Leonard Leo and ABA Watch to share their data with me even before publication.
My work on political diversity is currently supported by research grants available
to Northwestern faculty, including summer research funding and a 2001-2002 grant from
the G.D. Searle Fund. I would like to thank the Searle Fund and Dean David Van Zandt
for their financial support.
I must disclose that I have in the past received substantial funding for my work
from the American Bar Foundation (ABF), a think tank affiliated with the American Bar
Association. From 1979 through 1982, I was a salaried Research Attorney and Project
Director for the ABF and was the Review Editor of the ABF Research Journal.
2
. See Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from
Roosevelt Through Reagan 86-88 (1997); Michael D. Schattman, Article: Picking
Federal Judges: A Mysterious Alchemy, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1578, 1584-85 (1998).
3
. See Picking Federal Judges, supra note 2, at 86-88; Schattman, supra note 2, at
1584-85.
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a political function (though of a different sort) is the question that this study
examines.
In recent years, the ABA’s role in rating judges has become
increasingly controversial, 4 but mostly among those who are not academics.
While professors have noted that Bill Clinton's nominees were more highly
rated by the ABA than Ronald Reagan's or George H.W. Bush's nominees,5
scholars usually use this as evidence of how highly qualified the Clinton
nominees really are.6 Sheldon Goldman and Elliot Slotnick, the political
scientists who have published more articles discussing the ABA ratings than
any other academics, recently concluded that the ABA’s special role in the
pre-nomination reviews of judicial candidates “has for the most part worked
well for Republican and Democratic administrations over the last half

4

. R. Townsend Davis, Jr., The American Bar Association and
Judicial Nominees: Advice Without Consent?, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 550 (1989); Kim
Dayton, Judicial Vacancies and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 67
St. John's L. Rev. 757 (1993); Orrin G. Hatch, The Politics of Picking Judges, 6 J.L. &
Pol. 35 (1989); R. Samuel Paz, Federal District Court Nomination Process: Smears of
Controversy and Ideological Sentinels, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 903 (1995).
5
. See Sheldon Goldman and Elliot Slotnick, Clinton’s Second Term Judiciary:
Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 Judicature 265 (1999) (“six years’ worth of Clinton
appointees yielded the highest proportion of all four administrations receiving the top
ratings from the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary of the American Bar
Association.”); Carl Tobias, Choosing Judges at the Close of the Clinton Administration,
52 Rutgers L. Rev. 827, 839 (2000)(“Moreover, the American Bar Association gave the
Clinton nominees the highest rankings since the Bar Association began assessing the
competence of candidates . . . .”); Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton
Administration's End, 19 Law & Ineq. J. 159, 167-68 (2001)(“Moreover, the ABA
assigned sixty-three percent of the nominees whom the President tendered the highest
ranking as well qualified; this number was ten percentage points greater than the ratings
earned by those lawyers whose names the Reagan and Bush Administrations
submitted.”).
6
. See Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerald Gryski, and Gary Zuk, Clinton’s
Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 Judicature 228, 245 (2001) (“Measures of the
quality of the appointees are subjective; however, whatever their flaws, the ABA ratings
are seen by most observers as a rough measure of how leading members of the bar and
bench view the candidates for judicial positions. By this measure, the Clinton
administration’s overall record yielded the highest quality judiciary since the ABA began
its rating system.”); id. at 248. See also Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerald
Gryski, and Gary Zuk, Recent Clinton Nominees, 84 Judicature 232 (2001) (“During
1999 and 2000 there were a number of Clinton appointees with particularly strong
professional credentials who also received the highest ABA rating of ‘well qualified.’”)
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century.”7 The conservative grumblings about possible ABA political
favoritism recently led the White House to end the ABA’s privileged
position in screening candidates before nomination, despite the allegations
being largely impressionistic and anecdotal.
Without controlling for background credentials, one cannot make
even a good circumstantial case for the existence of political bias in rating
the qualifications of judges. Even with good control variables for many
important qualifications, still one does not prove bias with statistics. One at
most shows data consistent with the hypothesis that there is bias. This study
does precisely that.
The dawn of a new administration is a good time to assess aspects of
the last one. For comparison with the Clinton administration, I examined
data from the first Bush administration, that of George H.W. Bush. After
examining data on nominees to the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal over these
two administrations, this study shows—for the first time—strong evidence
of differential treatment of nominees by the ABA's rating committee. This
study compares the ABA ratings to the credentials of the 108 men and
women nominated and confirmed for the U. S. Courts of Appeals during the
last two presidential administrations (including one recess appointment). I
have no data on those who were not confirmed, so I do not know whether
the patterns in these data are stronger or weaker for them.
The task of evaluating the credentials of judges has been undertaken
by the Association’s 15-member Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary. The ABA rates judges as Well Qualified, Qualified, or Not
Qualified. Judges who receive a "Not Qualified" rating would not ordinarily
be viable candidates to get through Senate confirmation. The ABA
committees often split their votes on the ratings, so it is possible to get, for
example, a majority of the ABA committee voting "Qualified" and a
minority voting "Not Qualified." Effectively, this particular split rating is
the lowest one that would give a judge a reasonable chance of getting
appointed and the lowest rating that I found in these data.
The credentials used by the ABA are set out in numerous public
statements, articles, and booklets. The ABA-published booklet on the ratings
process states, “The Committee’s evaluation of prospective nominees…is

7

. See Clinton’s Judges, supra note 6, at 254 n.17.
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directed to professional qualifications—integrity, professional competence
and judicial temperament.”8
As for integrity, the ABA notes, “The prospective nominee’s
character and general reputation in the legal community are investigated, as
are his or her industry and diligence.”9 Professional competence
“encompasses such qualities as intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and
analytical ability, knowledge of the law and breadth of professional
experience.”10 For appellate court nominees, the ABA states that “the
Committee may place somewhat less emphasis on the importance of trial
experience as a qualification,”11 yet appellate nominees “should possess an
especially high degree of scholarship and academic talent and an unusual
degree of overall excellence.”12 Regarding judicial temperament, the ABA
states that the Committee “considers the prospective nominee’s compassion,
decisiveness, openmindedness, sensitivity, courtesy, patience, freedom from
bias, and commitment to equal justice.”13
Some of the qualifications that are reviewed by the ABA to assess
professional experience, competence, and intellect can be measured
empirically. Most of the variables examined in this study are both important
in themselves (such as having judicial or practice experience) and important
markers of intellectual or other sorts of ability (such as attending an elite law
school or serving on law review). Some of the ratings criteria, however,
cannot be measured empirically, such as integrity and judicial temperament.
Seven of the nine variables I used as predictors are staples of other studies of
the judicial nomination process (judicial experience, top 10 law school,
private practice, government practice, race, gender, and nominating
president). The two new predictor variables (law review and federal
clerkship) favor Clinton’s candidates, so their inclusion tends to explain a
8

. American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: What It
Is and How It Works 3 (March 1991). See Also Roberta Cooper Ramo and N. Lee
Cooper, The American Bar Association's Integral Role In The Federal Judicial Selection
Process: Excerpted Testimony Of Roberta Cooper Ramo and N. Lee Cooper Before The
Judiciary Committee Of The United States Senate, May 21, 1996, 12 St. John's J.L.
Comm. 93 (1996).
9
. See ABA, Standing Committee, supra note 8, at 3.
10
. Id.
11
. Id. at 4.
12
. Id.
13
. Id.
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small part of the observed differences between Clinton and Bush nominees.
Without the two new variables, the apparent political bias in the data would
have been even worse.
The data in this study were collected by ABA Watch, a newsletter that
evaluates the activities of the ABA,14 and supplied to me for analysis. I
checked over 70% of the data against other published databases and sources.
ABA Watch collected information about the professional qualifications of
confirmed judicial nominees, using primarily publicly available sources such
as the Federal Judicial Center’s web site, ABA archives and annual reports,
law reviews, and online professional and academic databases. If necessary,
they contacted judges directly to fill gaps in publicly available information.
Specifically, in addition to the ABA ratings, ABA Watch coded the
following credentials:
Whether the nominee served as a private practitioner. 15
Whether the nominee served as a government lawyer.
Whether the nominee had already served as a judge.
Whether the nominee attended a law school ranked as one of the 10
best in the current rankings from U.S. News and World Report.
• Whether the nominee served on law review while in law school.
• Whether the nominee had served as a law clerk to a federal judge.
•
•
•
•

Examining data on confirmed nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeal
over the last two administrations, I found significant differences in how the
ABA Standing Committee evaluated the professional qualifications of Bush
and Clinton appointees. While making simple comparisons between the
credentials of Clinton and Bush nominees, I found only three statistically
significant differences: (1) Clinton confirmed nominees are more likely to be
minorities (27%) than are Bush nominees (10%)16; (2) for those who lacked
prior judicial experience, the ABA committee split its votes more often for

14

. ABA Watch is a project of the Federalist Society.

15

. As for the length of practice, I performed analyses with linear and transformed
nonlinear predictor variables using the number of years of each type of practice. The
coefficients for the Clinton/Bush nominee variable are roughly similar when controlling
for the length of time in practice. See Appendix Table 11 for one of these models.
16
. Significance using exact versions of various tests (Gamma, Pearson’s R,
Pearson chi-square, Spearman correlation, and Likelihood ratio chi-square) met the .05
criterion: .029.
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Bush appointees (50%) than for Clinton appointees (10%);17 and (3) for
candidates without judicial experience, Bush appointees received lower
ABA ratings.18 Among those without prior judicial experience, the
differences were stark: 65% of Clinton nominees received the ABA’s
highest rating compared to 17% of Bush nominees.19

II
Are Democratic Nominees Favored by the ABA?
The ABA appears to have used very different measurable criteria for
evaluating Clinton appointees to the federal appellate bench than those used
for evaluating G.H.W. Bush’s candidates. Bush appellate appointees who
were lower court judges appear to have been equally treated compared to
Clinton appointees.20 Indeed, Bush nominees got an insignificant,
advantage. But among those without the central qualification—prior judicial
experience—the Clinton appointees appeared to get an extremely strong
boost just for being appointed by Bill Clinton, rather than some guy named
Bush.
Extensive data analysis revealed different patterns for evaluating
Clinton and Bush appointees. Logically, the most important credential for
being a judge is already being a judge. Further, it is unlikely that either
party would tend to elevate the worst judges among the many already in the
profession. Thus, being a judge was a strong positive credential—both
theoretically and in parts (but not all) of our data. Further, the ABA showed
no substantial differences one way or the other in evaluating candidates who
were former judges; Bush lower court judges fared about as well as Clinton

17

. Significance met the .05 criterion: gamma (.021), Pearson’s R (.003), Pearson
chi-square (.003), Spearman correlation (.003), and Likelihood ratio chi-square (.004).
18
. The Clinton nominees did not fare better because of any supposed affirmative
action, because the data did not suggest that any existed. Minority Clinton nominees got
slightly lower ABA ratings than their credentials would predict. Minority Bush nominees
got much lower ratings than their credentials would predict. Compare Tables 9 and 10 in
the Appendix (column B).
19
. Significance was easily met for those without judicial experience: gamma
(.001), Pearson’s R (.002), Pearson chi-square (.002), Spearman correlation (.002), and
Likelihood ratio chi-square (.002).
20
. See infra Appendix, Tables 6-8.
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lower court judges in ABA ratings for open federal appellate posts—in some
statistical models insignificantly better. 21
The interesting pattern is among those candidates who were not
already judges. Here, since the candidate lacked the most obvious credential
for the job, the ABA committee’s evaluations can be more subjective. Here
Clinton nominees fared strikingly better than Bush nominees. For example,
without judicial experience, 65% of Clinton appointees were unanimously
rated well qualified, while only 17% of the Bush appointees were so rated.
I used data on six credentials that are either important in themselves or
good indicators of other important credentials: (1) judicial experience, (2) an
elite law school education, (3) law review, (4) a federal court clerkship, (5)
private practice experience, and (6) government practice experience. Chart 1
shows how the ABA rated those nominees without prior judicial experience,
but with different numbers of the other credentials.
As you can see from this simple presentation of data in Chart 1,
without judicial experience Clinton nominees with few credentials are rated
much better (61% of the less qualified get the highest rating) than Bush
nominees with more credentials (only 20% of the more qualified get the
highest rating). Further, as the credentials of Clinton nominees improved,
their chances of getting the highest rating changed only slightly—from 61%
to 69%. That indicates that the evaluation process for Clinton appointees is
not driven by measurable credentials. Breadth of experience has little effect
on the ratings of Clinton appointees.

21

. See infra Chart 4; Appendix, Tables 6-8.
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Chart 1: % of Appellate Nominees Getting a "Well
Qualified" ABA Rating With Any of 5 Credentials
(Private Practice, Government Practice, Top 10 School,
Law Review, Federal Clerkship)
1989-2000 Confirmed Nominees With No Prior Judicial Experience, n=49
100%

90%

80%
Clinton
69%
70%
Clinton
61%
60%

50%

40%

30%
Bush
20%
20%

Bush
15%

10%

0%

1-3 Credentials

BUSH
CLINTON

4-5 Credentials

Total Number of Credentials for a Nominee
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To perform more sophisticated analyses controlling for credentials,
researchers like to predict the relative odds of a particular outcome. 22 Here
about 9 Clinton appointees are rated “Well Qualified” for every 5 who are
rated less qualified—a 65% to 35% probability translates into a 9 to 5 odds
of being "Well Qualified.” For Bush appointees, 1 appointee is rated "Well
Qualified" for every 5 rated lower than that (a 17% to 83% probability
translates into about 1 to 5 odds of being rated "Well Qualified"). Stated
another way, the odds of getting a "Well Qualified" rating are 9.1 times
higher for Clinton appointees than for Bush appointees. For every five
lower rated candidates, Bush would get only one highly rated candidate;
Clinton would get nine.23
I then did logistic regression analysis to predict the odds of receiving
the highest rating. When one controls for other credentials, the pattern of
preference for Clinton appointees just gets stronger. If one adds in control
variables for practice experience as either a private or government
attorney—among those without judicial experience Clinton appointees had
9.7 times greater odds of getting the highest ABA rating than similarly
qualified Bush I appointees (Table 1). Just being nominated by Clinton
instead of Bush is better than any other credential or than all other
credentials put together.24

22

. Odds-ratios (and log odds-ratios) are the staple of categorical data analysis in
the social sciences—being the heart of both logistic regression analysis and loglinear
analysis. Although less intuitive than percentages for all but frequent gamblers, oddsratios and log odds-ratios have more powerful statistical properties for modeling ratios.
23
. Here is a more precise version of the computations for appointees without
judicial experience. Comparing a 64.52% rate of highest ABA ratings for Clinton
appointees with a 16.67% rate for Bush appointees, the precise relative odds are
computed as: (.6452/(1-.6452))/(.1667/(1-.1667)=9.1 to 1. Thus the odds of a Clinton
appointee without judicial experience getting a well qualified rating are 9.1 times higher
than the odds of a Bush appointee without judicial experience getting the same rating.
24
. Indeed, the influence of the other credentials is negative in the model (see
column “B”).
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Table 1
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA Without Judicial Experience
But With Several Predictors:
Experience in Private Practice or as a Government Lawyer
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=49)
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating
-2 Log Likelihood
Goodness of Fit
Cox & Snell - R^2
Nagelkerke - R^2
Significance

56.145
48.343
.211
.281
.009

Variable

B (log-odds) S.E.

Clinton Nominee
Private Practice
Govt. Lawyer
Constant

2.277
-.580
-.171
-1.053

.753
1.053
.654
1.088

Signif. R

Exponent of B (odds)

.003
.582
.793
.334

9.743
.560
.843

.355
.000
.000

Because this database contains all the nominated and confirmed
judges, not a sample of them, statistical significance is literally meaningless.
Significance testing is designed to assess the degree of confidence one can
have that estimates obtained from a sample will approach the true
parameters of the population from which they were drawn. Thus, little
weight should be given to statistical significance here, since our means are
exactly the population means. What is important here are the strength of
relationships and the explanatory power of variables.
Nonetheless, the computed significance of this model is .009, easily
meeting the standard .05 significance level. The computed significance of
any variable is shown in the “Signif.” column; being a Clinton nominee v. a
Bush nominee is significant at the .003 level. The column “R” shows a high
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pseudo-R25 of .355. The column “Exponent of B” (exponent of the
coefficient in the “B” column) shows the relative odds of being a Clinton
nominee v. a Bush nominee (here 9.7 times). The “B” column is the
increase or decrease in the log of the odds of being rated well qualified
associated with any particular variable. A logistic regression equation is
based on fitting a constant and each variable and its log-odds (using data in
the second column of the table). 26
When one controls for experience as a federal court clerk, attending
an elite (top 10) law school, and serving on law review, the preference for
Clinton appointees gets stronger still. Now controlling for all measured
credentials, Clinton appointees without judicial experience have 10.5 times
greater odds of getting a well qualified rating from the ABA than Bush
appointees (Table 2). As in Table 1, just being nominated by Clinton instead
of Bush is better than any other credential or than all other credentials put
together.
Applying this model fitting the data, consider a fairly well qualified
appointee with private and government practice experience, federal clerkship
experience, law review, and a J.D. from an elite law school. If that person
were nominated by Clinton, she would have an 60% probability of getting
the ABA’s highest rating. If that person were instead nominated by Bush,
she would have only a 13% probability of getting the highest rating.
Or consider a less qualified candidate. Assume that he has private
practice experience and no other standard credential. He could expect a 67%
chance of getting the ABA’s highest rating if he were a Clinton nominee, but
only a 16% chance if he were a Bush appointee, despite having identical
mediocre credentials.

25

. This pseudo-R is roughly equivalent to R, a standardized correlation
coefficient in linear regression.
26
. Each variable is coded “1” if the credential is present, “0” if the credential is
not present. The logistic regression equation in Table 1 is:
y=-1.053+(2.277*Clinton Nominee)+(-.580*Private Pract)+(-.171*Govt Lawyer).
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Table 2
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA Without Judicial Experience
But With Several Predictors:
Politics, Federal Clerkship, Elite Law School, Law Review, and
Practice Experience
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=49)
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating
-2 Log Likelihood
Goodness of Fit
Cox & Snell - R^2
Nagelkerke - R^2
Significance
Variable
Clinton Nominee
Private Practice
Govt. Lawyer
Top 10 JD
Law Review
Fed. Clerkship
Constant

53.41
46.33
.254
.338
.026
B (log-odds) S.E.
2.354
-.741
-.343
-1.094
.459
.679
-.895

.800
1.177
.682
.778
.738
.738
1.316

Signif. R

Exponent of B (odds)

.003
.529
.615
.160
.534
.358
.497

10.527
.476
.710
.335
1.583
1.972

.345
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

But perhaps there is something else going on here. Perhaps minority
and female appointees have less traditional credentials. Since Clinton
appointed more females and minorities than Bush, perhaps I should control
for being minority or female (even though they are not credentials per se).
In Table 3 I do just that. When one controls for being minority or female
and all measured credentials, the Clinton appointees have 9.9 times higher
odds of receiving the highest rating from the ABA. As in Tables 1-2, for
those without judicial experience, just being nominated by Clinton instead of
Bush is better than any other credential or than all other credentials put
together.
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In evaluating those who lack judicial experience, the pattern of
apparent preference for Democrats is extremely strong and consistent for all
models with various control variables. When one controls for relevant
credentials, such as education and work experience, the ABA preference for
Clinton appointees just gets trivially stronger.

Table 3
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA Without Judicial Experience
But With Several Predictors:
Politics, Federal Clerkship, Elite Law School, Law Review,
Practice Experience, Gender, and Ethnicity
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=49)
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating
-2 Log Likelihood
Goodness of Fit
Cox & Snell R^2
Nagelkerke R^2
Significance

Variable

53.197
46.367
.257
.343
.069

B (log-odds)

Clinton Nominee
Private Practice
Govt. Lawyer
Top 10 JD
Law Review
Fed. Clerkship
Female
Minority
Constant

2.289
-.818
-.276
-1.093
.481
.667
.423
.397
-.902

S.E.
.807
1.172
.706
.814
.803
.745
1.069
1.440
1.300

Signif. R

Exponent of B (odds)

.005
.485
.696
.179
.549
.371
.692
.783
.488

9.862
.441
.759
.335
1.617
1.947
1.527
1.488

.337
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
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III
Were Different Criteria Used to Evaluate
Bush and Clinton Nominees?
The widely different ratings given to Bush and Clinton appointees
with the same measured credentials suggest a different set of criteria used to
evaluate Bush and Clinton appointees. That possibility is explored in this
section.
Running separate logistic regression equations for Bush and Clinton
appointees reveals different patterns of evaluation. If one looks first at the
Bush appointees, one sees a striking pattern. Without judicial experience,
Bush appointees have little hope of getting a “Well Qualified” rating from
the ABA. While it is logical that judicial experience would be the preeminent credential, the strength of the relationship is surprising. For Bush
appointees, being a judge increases the relative odds of getting the highest
rating by over 1,300 percent (14.8 times greater odds). If a Bush appointee
does not have prior judicial experience, however, the ABA appears to start
with a strong presumption that the candidate is not “Well Qualified.”
Bush appointees without measurable credentials start at an extremely
strong disadvantage (a probability of 5% of getting the highest rating). 27
Then one credential—judicial experience—counts strongly to move Bush
appointees toward obtaining a “Well Qualified” rating. It is the only
variable that is statistically significant and the only variable that
substantially drives the explanatory power of the model. For example, being
a judge raises the initial probability of receiving the highest ABA rating
from 5% to 45%.28 Each other credential moves the candidate toward higher
ratings (except for attending an elite law school, which has a small negative
effect). Having private practice experience would increase the probability of
a high rating from the starting point of 5% to only 10%.
In other words, for Bush appointees credentials are very important
predictors of high ratings (as they logically should be). The model is
statistically significant despite the small number of cases. While the
27

. The constant of –2.907 in the 2nd column can be converted to a probability of

5%.
28

. If you sum the constant (-2.907) and the coefficient B (2.697) for judicial
experience, you get -.21, which translates to a probability of 45%.
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measured disadvantage for not having prior judicial experience seems much
too large to be justified on policy grounds, the process is roughly
bureaucratically rational in the Weberian sense. Those without any of the
traditional credentials have little hope of getting a top rating from the ABA.
As credentials improve, the ratings of Bush appointees rise. Although very
harsh for those lacking judicial experience, the ABA process for Bush
candidates is based on measurable credentials that the ABA considers
important—practice experience, educational background, and especially
judicial experience.

Table 4
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA For Bush Nominees
With Several Predictors:
Judicial Experience, Federal Clerkship, Elite Law School,
Law Review, And Practice Experience
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-1992
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=42)
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating
-2 Log Likelihood
Goodness of Fit
Cox & Snell R^2
Nagelkerke R^2
Significance
Variable

44.838
42.728
.266
.356
.043

B (log-odds) S.E.

Judicial Exp.
2.697
Private Practice .714
Govt. Lawyer
.443
Top 10 JD
-.245
Law Review
.610
Fed. Clerkship
.617
Constant
-2.907

.918
1.210
.819
.770
1.043
1.050
1.486

Signif.

R

Exponent of B (odds)

.003
.555
.589
.750
.558
.557
.051

.379
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

14.829
2.042
1.558
.783
1.841
1.853
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For Clinton appointees to the federal appellate bench, the pattern is
somewhat different—experience matters much less than it should. Here
Clinton appointees without any measured credentials start off with a very
strong presumption (a 48% probability) that they are “Well Qualified.” On
balance, credentials do not increase the odds of getting the highest ABA
rating by as much as would seem reasonable. Moreover, the model has very
poor explanatory power. Judicial experience logically should be a strong
positive credential, but it is instead an insignificant influence on ABA
ratings for Clinton appointees.

Table 5
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA For Clinton Nominees
With Several Predictors:
Judicial Experience, Federal Clerkship, Elite Law School,
Law Review, and Practice Experience
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1993-2000
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=66)
-2 Log Likelihood 84.176
Goodness of Fit
65.871
Cox & Snell R^2
.050
Nagelkerke R^2
.068
Significance
.757
Variable

B (log-odds) S.E.

Judicial Exp.
.067
Private Practice -.123
Govt. Lawyer
.505
Top 10 JD
-.120
Law Review
.286
Fed. Clerkship
.815
Constant
-.096

.589
.781
.544
.545
.585
.603
1.032

Signif.

R

Exponent of B (odds)

.909
.875
.353
.826
.625
.176
.926

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

1.070
.885
1.658
.887
1.331
2.259

This table’s data are disturbing because the influence of credentials
(the “B” column and the “R” column) is weak, accounting for trivial
amounts of the variance in the data. Measured credentials should increase
one’s ABA ratings substantially, but they don’t. It is as if the ABA

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art37

August 3, 2001

ABA Ratings of Federal Appellate Nominees

Page 17

evaluated Bush appointees according to measured credentials, but for
Clinton appointees, experience had little influence on what are subjective
judgments reached on other grounds. The process for evaluating Clinton
nominees does not appear to be bureaucratically rational in the rough
Weberian sense.
Consider this example applying the Bush and Clinton logistic
regression models (Tables 4 and 5). Which nominee would you expect to be
more likely to get a “Well Qualified” rating? According to the statistical
model fitting the data, Clinton nominees without relevant measurable
credentials rate higher than Bush nominees with extensive relevant
experience:
Clinton Nominee

Bush Nominee

NO Elite Law School JD
NO Federal Court Clerkship
NO Law Review Experience
NO Private Practice
NO Government Practice

Elite (Top 10) Law School JD
Federal Court Clerkship
Law Review Experience
Private Practice
Government Practice

Probability of Highest Rating: 48%

Probability of Highest Rating: 32%

Amazingly, a Bush appointee with good credentials— both private
and government practice experience, a top-10 law school education, law
review experience, and a federal court clerkship—has a lower probability
(32%) of getting the highest ABA rating than a Clinton appointee who has
none of these credentials (48% chance). If a Clinton nominee had any one
of these five credentials, he would have at least a 45% chance of getting the
highest rating. If a nominee had all five credentials, she would have a 77%
chance if she were a Clinton nominee and a 32% chance if she were a Bush
nominee.
Based on a comparison of the relative odds corresponding to the
coefficients of the constants between the Bush and Clinton models (Tables 4
and 5), for candidates with no measured credentials the odds of a Clinton
appointee getting a “Well Qualified” ABA rating are a staggering 16.6 times
higher than for a Bush appointee. Converting relative odds to probabilities,
if a Clinton appointee with no measured credentials has a 48% chance of
getting the highest ABA rating, an identically unqualified Bush appointee
would have only a 5% chance of getting the top ABA rating. It is rare to see
a nonobvious relationship of this size in the social sciences.
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Chart 2: Chances of Getting a "Well Qualified" ABA
Rating by Specific Credentials of U.S. Court of Appeals
Nominees by Presidential Administration
1989-2000 Confirmed Nominees, model Ns=66+42
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Of course, neither president is appointing completely unqualified
nominees.29 Thus, this last comparison of seemingly unqualified candidates
is more theoretical than actual. What these stark model effects really reflect
is that, for Bush appointees, credentials (particularly judicial experience)
really matter in raising their chances for a higher rating. For Clinton
appointees, on the other hand, ratings do not turn much on their measured
professional credentials. It is enough to have been recommended by Bill
Clinton.
What about more common sets of credentials? In Charts 3 and 4, I
present the nine most common sets of actual credentials that the nominated
judges presented for ABA evaluation (4 to 9 nominees presented each set of
credentials). Computing the probabilities of several sets of credentials using
the Clinton and Bush logistic regression equations in Tables 4 and 5, we see
two very different patterns. For those without judicial experience, Clinton
nominees have much better chances of getting the highest ABA rating of
unanimously well qualified (Chart 3).
For those with judicial experience, however, the Bush nominees are
treated somewhat better than the Clinton nominees in all models that include
private practice experience (Chart 4). That is because the strongest positive
variable for Bush appointees is judicial experience, while the strongest
negative credential for Clinton appointees is private practice experience. In
the one model in Chart 4 without private practice, Clinton appointees have a
trivially higher probability of getting the highest ABA rating—unanimously
well qualified. In the other models, Bush nominees are actually advantaged
by 11-16%, though these moderately substantial effects are small enough to
be statistically insignificant.

29

. Two of the three Clinton nominees with only one of the six credentials got the
highest “Well Qualified” rating (67%), while only one of the five Bush nominees with a
single credential was rated “Well Qualified” (20%).
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Chart 3: Chances of Getting a "Well Qualified" ABA
Rating by Specific Credentials of U.S. Court of Appeals
Nominees by Presidential Administration
Most Common Sets of Credentials (excluding Judicial Experience)

1989-2000 Confirmed Nominees, model Ns=66+42
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Chart 4: Chances of Getting a "Well Qualified" ABA
Rating by Specific Credentials of U.S. Court of Appeals
Nominees by Presidential Administration
Most Common Sets of Credentials (including Judicial Experience)
1989-2000 Confirmed Nominees, model Ns=66+42
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IV
Policy Implications
The policy question of how to use ABA ratings in evaluating
nominees for appointment naturally arises. Yet this is not a social science
question; statistical information cannot tell us what the White House, the
U.S. Senate, or the ABA should do. There is no reason in this study to
question the validity of ABA ratings of Republican nominees with lower
court judicial experience. They do just fine. As for the ratings of nominees
with no lower court experience, however, the patterns revealed in the data
are consistent with a conclusion of strong political bias favoring Democrats.
While a cautious academic would not determine conclusively that such a
bias exists, neither would a cautious academic likely favor continuing to use
the results of an evaluative process that seems to be so strongly biased. This
is not a problem of a few percentage points here or there; the effect sizes are
extremely large. Nonetheless, one should always be cautious in drawing
conclusions, especially where there are important unmeasured variables not
in the models, such as integrity or judicial temperament.
The process of evaluating Clinton nominees cannot be shown to bear
any logical relation to some of the criteria that the ABA purports to use. If
the ABA’s highly subjective process is somehow consistent with ABA
standards, it would have to be because differences in unmeasured criteria
(e.g., integrity and judicial temperament) are so huge, important, and
identifiable that they entirely swamp the measured criteria of judicial
experience, law school background, and legal practice experience. Not only
does that seem extraordinarily unlikely, but whether such a sanguine state of
affairs exists is a matter of faith, not evidence.
The business of evaluating prospective judges is not driven by
academic standards; decisions must be made. One obvious policy response
would be for the ABA to cease rating judges until it can eliminate the
apparent bias or show that no bias exists. Another approach might be for the
Senate, the White House, and the press to de-emphasize or ignore entirely
the ABA ratings because of probable political bias. The White House of
George W. Bush recently ended a long-standing practice of allowing the
ABA to pre-screen judicial candidates, but the Democratic-controlled Senate
Judiciary Committee has vowed not to hold any hearings until it has
reviewed the ABA’s ratings.
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Another possible approach would be to adjust the Republican ratings
for the measured amount of observed preference for Democrats.30 I
tentatively suggest how this probable bias can be quantified in usable terms.
The committee decisions are sometimes unanimous. Other times, they are
split—such as between “Qualified” and “Well Qualified”—necessitating
some combinations of ratings. Consider the following 4-point scale of ABA
ratings:
0—Not Qualified/Qualified (split)
1—Qualified (unanimous)
2—Qualified/Well Qualified (split)
3—Well Qualified (unanimous)
Multiple linear regression analysis can provide an estimate of the
amount of apparent political discrimination present in the data. 31 For those
candidates without judicial experience, controlling for all measured
credentials, the mean ABA bias effect is .9 rating point, rounded to the
nearest tenth of a point. In other words, Bush nominees are rated nearly one
point lower than Clinton nominees with the same level of measured
credentials.
For example, assume a Bush nominee was rated with a split decision
between “Qualified” and “Well Qualified” (coded at 2 points). After
correcting for the ABA bias effect by adding .9 points, he or she could be
considered by the Senate as having 2.9 points, nearly the equivalent of a
Clinton nominee with the highest rating of unanimously “Well Qualified,”
rated at 3 points. No bias adjustment is necessary for Republican nominees
with prior judicial experience, who appeared to have received measurably
fair treatment from the ABA in the 1989-92 period.
What might the ABA do to eliminate the apparent bias? The most
obvious solution is not without problems: its evaluation committee could be
explicitly balanced by party affiliation. But the goal should be nonpartisan
ABA evaluations, not bipartisan ABA evaluations. Bipartisan committees
might result in more split evaluations and a different role for committee
members who might think that they are supposed to represent their party’s
interests.
30
31

. This study modeled the party of the president, not the party of the nominee.
. See infra Appendix, Table 11.
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Certainly, the ABA should monitor the results of its evaluative
process of judicial nominees in the current Bush administration to see if the
ABA has fallen back into its old ways: the hard, skeptical approach that it
used to evaluate the credentials of nominees in the first Bush administration
but dropped when Bill Clinton took office. The ABA should be particularly
careful not to replicate what appears to have been its especially harsh
treatment of minority Republican nominees from the first Bush
administration (compared to their credentials). 32
Rooting out political bias is more difficult than it might seem. There
are no quick fixes. But if the ABA cannot overcome its apparent political
biases (or plausibly demonstrate that they do not exist), the ABA should
reluctantly withdraw from the process of rating federal court nominees. At
the end of the day, one nagging question remains: why didn’t the ABA itself
see the extraordinarily large political differences in its evaluative processes
and work harder to understand, explain, or eliminate them?

V
Conclusion
The American Bar Association’s ratings of nominees to the U.S.
Court of Appeals reveal some disturbing patterns. Yet this is not a simple
story of apparent ABA bias toward Clinton nominees. The patterns are more
complex than that. Among nominees with the most important credential—
prior judicial experience—Clinton nominees are not favored over Bush
nominees; Bush nominees fare roughly as well and sometimes even better
than Clinton nominees (though the differences are not large enough to be
statistically significant). In some cases involving particular sets of
credentials, the probability that a Bush nominee might get the highest ABA

32

. See infra Table 9. Bush minority appointees were 11 times more likely than
white Bush appointees with identical credentials to get a rating below unanimously well
qualified. Because of the low number of Bush minority nominees, this effect was not
statistically significant (p=.14). The suggestion that minorities get lower ABA ratings
than their credentials would predict has been made before. Roger E. Hartley, Senate
Delay of Minority Judicial Nominees: A Look at Race, Gender, and Experience, 84
Judicature 190 (2001).
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rating is even higher than the probability for a similarly credentialed Clinton
nominee.33
The problem arises for those without judicial experience. Here the
apparent preference for Clinton appointees is strikingly large. Controlling
for credentials, Clinton nominees have over 10 times better odds of getting a
unanimous well qualified rating than similarly credentialed Bush appointees.
Just being nominated by Clinton instead of Bush is a stronger positive
variable than any other credential or than all other credentials put together. 34
These results are consistent with reports from some participants in the
process of judicial selection. Stephen Calabresi, a Northwestern law
professor who was involved in judicial selection in the Reagan-Bush era,
commented, “After the Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1986,
we made determined efforts to pick sitting federal or state judges for
appellate court vacancies. We assumed that lower court judges would have
an easier time being reviewed by the ABA.”35 Asked if this had an effect on
who was picked, Calabresi said, “Definitely, yes.”36 It is worrisome to think
that the political preferences of ABA committee members might be driving
who is selected by a president to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Even the process of evaluation is different: the ratings of Bush
nominees can be shown to be related to measurable credentials; the
evaluation of Clinton nominees cannot. Using multiple logistic regression
analysis, I explored whether the basic credentials—(1) judicial experience,
(2) a top-10 law school education, (3) law review, (4) a federal court
clerkship, (5) private practice experience, and (6) government practice
experience—were evaluated similarly when considering Bush and Clinton
appointees. Surprisingly, a Bush appointee with top credentials on five of
these six criteria (excluding only judicial experience) has a lower chance
(32%) of getting the highest ABA rating than a Clinton appointee (48%)
who has none of these six credentials.
If one examines Bush and Clinton nominees separately, one sees that
Bush nominees face an uphill battle to get the ABA’s highest rating, but
33

.
.
35
.
36
.
34

See supra Chart 4.
See supra Charts 1-3.
Personal communication with Stephen Calabresi, July 11, 2001.
Id.
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winning the battle is based on measured credentials. On the other hand, there
measured credentials have only a modest effect on the already favorable
odds that a Clinton nominee will be rated well qualified. The process for
Bush nominees is substantially objective; the process for Clinton nominees
is almost entirely subjective.
The differences in how the ABA treats Bush and Clinton nominees
reaches even to the committee’s internal decision making. The ABA
committee split its vote 33% of the time while evaluating Bush appointees,
but only 17% of the time when evaluating Clinton appointees.37 This
difference was concentrated among those who lacked prior judicial
experience, where 50% of Bush appointees had split ratings, compared to
only 10% of Clinton appointees with split ratings.38 These splits are doubly
odd because the Clinton appointees were more subjectively evaluated than
the Bush appointees. This odd unanimity is suggestive of a strong shared
mindset favoring Clinton appointees without regard to measured credentials.
If Clinton nominees had been evaluated according to the credentials
and background characteristics (race and gender) used to rate Bush
appointees (Table 9’s model39), only 36% of Clinton nominees would have
received the highest ABA rating, rather than the 62% that actually received
that rating. Clinton’s nominees would have fared very poorly if they were
evaluated according to the pattern revealed in the data for Bush nominees.
What if one leaves race and gender effects out of the models and
sticks just to intellectual and experience credentials? If Clinton nominees
had been subjected to the same credentials-driven process that Bush
candidates were subjected to (Table 4’s model), only 46% of Clinton’s
nominees would have been unanimously rated as well qualified, rather than
the 62% that actually received that top rating from the ABA. This 46% is
nearly identical to the 45% well qualified ratings that George H.W. Bush’s
nominees actually received from the ABA. In other words, using the
standards for weighting measured credentials that the ABA applied to the
37

. Significance tests done in the normal fashion met the .05 criterion. Tests

done as exact tests miss it slightly: gamma (.061), Pearson’s R (.061), Pearson chi-square
(.042), Spearman correlation (.061), and Likelihood ratio chi-square (.061).
38
. Significance met the .05 criterion: gamma (.021), Pearson’s R (.003), Pearson
chi-square (.003), Spearman correlation (.003), and Likelihood ratio chi-square (.004).
39
. See Appendix, Table 9.
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Bush nominees, the Bush and Clinton nominees had on average almost
identically strong qualifications. Yet both groups were not rated identically
by the American Bar Association. Despite having no better measured
credentials than Bush nominees, the Clinton nominees were rated as more
qualified.
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APPENDIX
Table 6
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA With Judicial Experience
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=59)
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating
-2 Log Likelihood 74.459
Goodness of Fit
58.481
Cox & Snell R^2
.057
Nagelkerke R^2
.078
Significance
.324
Variable
B (log-odds)
Clinton Nominee
-.467
Private Practice
.835
Govt. Lawyer
1.061
Constant
-.524

S.E.
.584
.806
.624
.946

Signif.
.424
.300
.089
.580

R
.000
.000
.107

Exponent of B (odds)
.627
2.305
2.890

Table 7
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA With Judicial Experience
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=59)
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating
-2 Log Likelihood
69.782
Goodness of Fit
58.190
Cox & Snell R^2
.129
Nagelkerke R^2
.176
Significance
.227
Variable
Clinton Nominee
Private Practice
Govt. Lawyer
Top 10 JD
Law Review
Fed. Clerkship
Constant

B (log-odds)
-.671
.623
1.145
.362
.817
1.371
-.788

S.E.
.629
.840
.681
.627
.807
.875
.977

Signif. R
.286 .000
.458 .000
.093 .106
.563 .000
.311 .000
.117 .078
.420

Exponent of B (odds)
.511
1.865
3.143
1.437
2.264
3.940
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Table 8
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA With Judicial Experience
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=59) Dependent Var.: Well Qualified
-2 Log Likelihood 66.028
Goodness of Fit
58.849
Cox & Snell R^2
.183
Nagelkerke R^2
.249
Significance
.155
Variable
B (log-odds)
Clinton Nominee
-.662
Private Practice
.850
Govt. Lawyer
1.396
Top 10 JD
.303
Law Review
.503
Fed. Clerkship
1.594
Female
.939
Minority
-.832
Constant
-1.154

S.E.
.710
.920
.740
.653
.835
.910
.695
.701
1.102

Signif.
.351
.356
.059
.642
.547
.080
.177
.235
.295

R
Exponent of B (odds)
.000 .516
.000 2.339
.150 4.038
.000 1.354
.000 1.654
.124 4.925
.000 2.556
.000
.435

Table 9
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA For Bush Nominees
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-1992
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=42) Dependent Var.: Well Qualified
-2 Log Likelihood 42.220
Goodness of Fit
40.930
Cox & Snell R^2
.311
Nagelkerke R^2
.415
Significance
.048
Variable
B (log-odds)
Judicial Exp.
3.233
Private Practice .244
Govt. Lawyer
.243
Top 10 JD
-.572
Law Review
.796
Fed. Clerkship
.815
Female
-.527
Minority
-2.398
Constant
-2.401

S.E.
1.074
1.294
.862
.825
1.081
1.104
1.062
1.623
1.546

Signif.
.003
.850
.778
.488
.462
.460
.620
.140
.120

R
.397
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
-.064

Exponent of B (odds)
25.350
1.276
1.275
.565
2.216
2.260
.590
.091
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Table 10
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating
From the ABA For Clinton Nominees
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1993-2000
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=66) Dependent Var.: Well Qualified
-2 Log Likelihood
Goodness of Fit
Cox & Snell R^2
Nagelkerke R^2
Significance

81.178
66.243
.092
.126
.6025

Variable
B (log-odds) S.E.
Judicial Exp.
-.162 .663
Private Practice
-.018 .802
Govt. Lawyer
.549
.562
Top 10 JD
-.010 .564
Law Review
-.001 .638
Fed. Clerkship
.911
.618
Female
1.063
.663
Minority
-.297 .666
Constant
-.287 1.064

Signif.
.807
.982
.328
.986
.999
.141
.109
.656
.787

R
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.045
.082
.000

Exponent of B (odds)
.850
.983
1.732
.990
.999
2.487
2.894
.743

Table 11
Predicting the ABA Ratings For Nominees Without Judicial
Experience, Linear Regression Model
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis (n=49) Dependent Var.: ABA 4-point Rating
R: .569

R2: .324
F
2.392

Model

Variable
Clinton Nom
Private Pract
Yrs. Priv. Pr. (Stand.)
Government Lwr
Yrs. Govt. Pr. (Stand.)
Fed. Clerkship
Law Review
Top 10 JD
Constant

B
873
-.143
-.033
-.534
.227
.117
.431
-.660
2.067

df
8

S.E.
.272
.490
.171
.333
.185
.288
.278
.277
.501

Significance
.033

Beta
.442
-.049
-.037
-.279
.241
.061
.226
-.346

t

Sig

3.204
-.293
-.195
-1.601
1.225
.407
1.552
-2.382
4.129

.003
.771
.846
.117
.228
.686
.129
.022
.000
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